

High-Risk Unified Commander (HRUC)
 Achieving Simultaneous Tactical and Medical Objectives
 During Active Violence

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 Allie and Zach's Dad

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 Oakland County Tactical Training Consortium

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 International Tactical EMS Association

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2

**“Ten minutes!
 This thing will be over in two minutes! Get on it!”**

Actor James Tolkan
 Commander Tom “Stinger” Jardian
 Top Gun

3



“Come quickly! We are terrified”

Kristina Anderson Froling
Executive Director
The Koshka Foundation

4



Rules of Engagement

We'll be discussing low-hanging fruit, black swans, gray rhinos, doomed captives, and potential solutions ... not THE solutions.

If anyone needs to take a break, please do so and confidentially let me know if you need anything.

My cell is (248) 842-7044.

5

Operational Goals

1. Stop the Killing
2. Stop the Dying
3. Stop the Crying

6




First Things First ...

Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) is a necessity. If your local Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team doesn't possess this capability, they're wrong.

7

Tactical Response and Operations Standard for Law Enforcement Agencies



National Tactical Officers Association
Published April, 2018


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“And if you’re going to tell my child to stay put ... that you’re coming to get her. Then either go in there and do something or take off the uniform and find another job. But that day, you were a cop and that day you chose to stand by and listen to homicide.”

Dawn Anna
 Mother of deceased Columbine student Lauren Townsend
 Interview with Ed Bradley for 60 Minutes II
 April 17, 2001

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
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“Is it safe?”

**Actor Laurence Olivier
Dr. Christian Szell
Marathon Man**

19

We’ve Been Doing This Awhile ...

1. Extraordinary Deployment
2. Contained Threat Escort Tactics
3. High-Risk Extraction Protocol
4. Rescue Task Force
5. Warm Zone Care

20

**Module 1
The History of Active Violence**

21

Active Shooter

“an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearm[s] and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.”

Department of Homeland Security

“one or more subjects who participate in a random or systematic shooting spree, demonstrating their intent to continuously harm others. An active shooter’s overriding objective appears to be that of mass murder, rather than criminal conduct such as robbery, kidnapping, etc. The definition of an active shooter can include any assault with a deadly weapon causing a mass homicide.”

National Tactical Officers Association

22

Domestic Violent Extremist

“An individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence.”

Department of Homeland Security
Department of Justice

23

In 2013, President Obama signed into law the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, which granted the attorney general the authority to assist in the investigation of “violent acts and shootings occurring in a place of public use” and in the investigation of “mass killings and attempted mass killings at the request of an appropriate law enforcement official of a state or political subdivision.”

**Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012,
28 USC 530C(b)(1)(M)(i)**

24

Active Shooter Event

The standard researcher's definition of an active shooter event:

"Three or more people shot in a public place with no related gang or drug activity and not secondary to the commission of another crime."

This definition highlights the apparent randomness of the attacks.

It should be noted that no incident since 2000 has included three offenders and only 2% have included two.

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Not so fast my friend!



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April 9, 2014 (0 Killed and 21 Injured)

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Inspire Magazine (2011, Issue 2)


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Rumiya Publication (2016)


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


April 15, 2013 (3 Killed and 265 Injured)


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
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
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
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
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
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


NO NOTORIETY MEDIA PROTOCOL
To reduce rampage acts of mass violence due to media-inspired fame.

- Adhere to the journalistic principle to "Minimize Harm," keeping in mind the responsibility of balancing the public's need for information vs. potential harm.
- Recognize that the prospect of infamy serves as a motivating factor for other individuals to kill and inspires copycat crimes
- Report the facts surrounding the mindset, demographic and motivational profile, without adding complimentary color to the individual or their actions, and downplay the individual's name and likeness, unless the alleged assailant is at large.
- Limit the name to once per piece as a reference point, never in the headlines and no photo above the fold. Refuse to broadcast/publish self-serving statements, photos, videos and/or manifestos made by the individual. After initial identification, limit the name and likeness of the individual in reporting, except when the alleged assailant is still at large and, in doing so, would aid in the assailant's capture.
- Elevate the names and likenesses of all victims killed and/or injured to send the message their lives are more important than the killer's actions.
- Agree to promote data and analysis from experts in mental health, public safety, and other relevant professions to support further steps to help eliminate the motivation behind mass murder.

IT'S A MATTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
No Name. No Photo. #NoNotoriety.
www.nonotriety.com


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41

The first recorded active violence incident in the United States arguably occurred in what is now Antrim Township, Pennsylvania on July 26, 1764. Often referred to by historians as the Enoch Brown Schoolhouse Massacre, it involved four Native Americans entering a schoolhouse for English settlers, beating to death and scalping the headmaster and 10 children, and wounding one other student. Earlier that day, the same Indians had murdered a pregnant settler and cut the baby out of her body.

42



May 18, 1927 (44 Killed and 58 Injured)

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August 1, 1966 (16 Killed and 32 Injured)

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


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Lessons Learned

1. The Potential for Familicide and Multiple Scenes
2. Combating Vertical Threats
3. Training for Open Air Rescues

47



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


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Lessons Learned

1. Situational Awareness for Firefighters
2. Open Air Assaults at the Patrol Level
3. Mental Health for Emergency Responders


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
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
Lessons Learned

1. Patrol Rifles and Dynamic Inner Perimeters
2. The Value of Tactical Emergency Casualty Care
3. Denial of Medical Treatment for Offenders

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Lessons Learned

1. Improvised Explosive Devices
2. Unconventional Use of Fire Department Apparatus
3. Familiarity with High Potential Locations

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


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Lessons Learned

1. Manual Breaching for Patrol
2. Early Activation of Tactical Teams
3. The Value of Extraction Teams

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
April 3, 2009 (13 Killed and 4 Injured)

63

Lessons Learned

1. Pre-Attack Behavior
2. Vehicle Used to Prevent Egress
3. Patrol Containment and SWAT Activation versus Rapid Deployment

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
Lessons Learned

1. Bad Things Can Happen at Night
2. The Importance of Setting a Hasty Inner Perimeter
3. Unconventional Transportation

68



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


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Lessons Learned

1. One Shooting Doesn't Necessarily Equal One Ambulance
2. The Frequency of No Stimulus
3. The Importance of Pediatric Mass Casualty Considerations

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


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Lessons Learned

1. The Role of a SWAT Medic in Active Violence
2. Loss of Warm Zone Care Discipline
3. Mobile Offenders

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


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Lessons Learned

1. Law Enforcement Extraction and Casualty Collection
2. Transition from Active Violence into Hostage Barricade
3. The Potential for Doomed Captives

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


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Lessons Learned

1. Special Event Planning
2. The Value of Throw Packs
3. Ghost Calls

83



November 5, 2017 (26 Killed and 20 Injured)

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


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Lessons Learned

1. Bad Things Can Happen in Small and Remote Towns
2. Armed Bystanders Might Get Involved
3. The Value of Law Enforcement Carrying Medical Supplies

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Lessons Learned

1. Public Safety Answering Point Challenges
2. Dereliction of Duty
3. Improvisation of Tactics

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Lessons Learned

1. Prolonged Gunfights
2. Many Elderly Casualties
3. Religious Considerations and the Deceased

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


96

Lessons Learned

1. When Casualties are Fellow Employees
2. When Most Casualties are Extracted by Civilians
3. Casualties Outside and on Three Different Floors

97



August 3, 2019 (22 Killed and 24 Wounded)

98



99

Lessons Learned

1. Offenders Wearing Hearing Protection
2. The Offender Surrendered Elsewhere
3. Inspired by The Great Replacement and International Terrorism

100



101



102

Lessons Learned

1. How Offenders Research the Tactics of Predecessors
2. How Many Victims Can Be Killed and Injured in 30 Seconds
3. How Easily Warm Zone Care can be Unnecessarily Delayed

103




104

Lessons Learned

1. Active Dying is Stimulus
2. The Value of Exterior and Interior Bosses
3. How Critical the Sharing of Real-Time Intelligence is

105



February 20, 2003 (100 Killed and 230 Injured)

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108

Module 2
Operations and Command Level Tactics


109

- Operational Objectives**
- Determine and Communicate the Mission and Strategy
 - Maintain Accountability
 - Contain and Neutralize the Threat/s
 - Treat, Extract, and Transport all Viable Victims
 - Isolate and Secure the Scene as Soon as Possible.
 - Begin the Criminal Investigation
 - Reunification
 - Initiate Mental Health Support for Emergency Responders

110

- Priorities of Life**
- Law enforcement is risking a lot to save a lot!
 - Fire departments and Emergency Medical Services are risking a little to save a lot!
 - Tactics over Medicine!
 - Medicine over the Investigation!
 - Emotional support is the responsibility of every supervisor!

111




“No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength.”

Field Marshal Helmuth Von Moltke
Chief of the Prussian General Staff
1857 - 1887

112

Operation Eagle Claw



April 24, 1980 (8 Killed and 4 Wounded)


113

Operation Trojan Horse



February 28 - April 19, 1993 (86 Killed and 16 Wounded)

114



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Lessons Learned

1. Don't Hide Tactical Teams
2. Targeting of Law Enforcement Officers
3. Unconventional Use of Deadly Force

119



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


122

Lessons Learned

1. Offender Use of Technology to Ambush Responders
2. The Loss of a Law Enforcement Officer to Blue on Blue
3. Victims Self-Transporting

123



124



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126

Lessons Learned

1. The Value of Ballistic Shields and Diversionary Devices
2. Challenges Associated with Blended Tactical Teams
3. Rescue Task Forces and Public Perception

127

PACE


Primary

Alternative

Contingency

Emergency

128



**“If everyone is thinking alike,
then somebody isn’t thinking.”**

General George S. Patton
United States Army

129

Conventional Fire and EMS Tactics

- Dispatch center communicates potential threat
- Responding fire department and/or ambulance service personnel determine initial staging location
- Out-of-hospital providers await indication from law enforcement the scene is "safe" or "secure"
- Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) providers may already be operating within the inner perimeter.
- Unified command not typically established until the hasty law enforcement command post is formalized

130

Conventional Tactics



131



"The fate of the wounded rests with the, one who applies the first dressing."

Nicholas Senn
President
American Medical Association
1897 - 1898

132

Conventional Uniforms



133

Conventional Equipment



134

Conventional Extraction



135

Post-Columbine Law Enforcement Roles


- Contact Team/s
- Initial Command and Coordination
- Inner and Outer Perimeter Control
- Extraction Team/s
- Specialty Team/s
- Investigation
- Reunification

136

Post-Columbine Terminology

- Conventional versus Asymmetric Tactics
- Perimeters versus Operational Zones
- Numerical versus Military Alphabet
- Slow and Methodical versus Search Mode
- Patient versus Victim versus Casualty
- Rescue Teams versus Extraction Teams
- Triage Codes versus Triage Colors
- Formal Unified Command versus Hasty

137



138

Contact Teams



“One or more law enforcement officers who enter the active violence environment with the intent of encountering and stopping the threat.”

139




140

Solo Officer Response?



141



142




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144

Mechanical Breaching for Patrol (Present)



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Mechanical Breaching for Patrol (Future)



146


**Tactical Medical Mindset
For Contact Teams**

**“Sometimes, the best medicine
is winning the gunfight!”**


HM3 Jim Etzin
Special Reaction Section
United States Marine Corps

147

But, what happens when you lose stimulus?!



148



149

Hasty Co-Located Unified Command (Outside)




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Perimeter Personnel



“Law enforcement officers AND engine or truck company personnel who position themselves on all sides of the incident to establish containment and manage casualties.”


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January 6, 2017 (5 Killed and 42 Injured)

152

Initial Arriving Company Officer



153

Ascertain where the hasty command post is and determine a staging area.

Direct dispatchers to remind responders to maintain ambulance corridors.

Direct crew members to establish an initial casualty collection point.

Proceed to the hasty command post and get briefed.

Request additional resources and establish a perimeter.

154

Request appropriate communication profiles and talk groups.

Be prepared to form and deploy a Functional Task Force.

Encourage the formation of Extraction Teams and ensure they have flexible litters.

Assign operational roles and radio designations.


Begin assembling, equipping, and deploying Rescue Task Forces.

155

Warm Zone Care Models

- Law Enforcement Rescue (Extraction Teams)
- Protected Corridor
- Protected Island
- Rescue Task Force

156




“These aren’t the droids you’re looking for.”

Actor Alec Guinness
Ben Kenobi
Star Wars: A New Hope

157

Extraction Teams




“Two or more law enforcement officers who enter the active assailant environment and facilitate casualty extraction.”

158

SALT Triage

SALT Mass Casualty Triage




159

Hasty Co-Located Bosses (Inside)




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Protected Corridor




161

Protected Island



162


Rescue Task Forces



“At least two law enforcement officers AND at least two medical providers entering the active assailant environment’s warm zone.”

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
Outdoor Venue



164

Indoor Venue

Good



Better

165



**“That was some of the best flying I’ve seen yet ...
right up to the part where you got killed.
You never never leave your wingman.”**

**Actor Michael Ironside
Lieutenant Commander Rick “Jester” Heatherly
Top Gun**

166

What if SWAT and/or TEMS Arrives Early?



167

Most SWAT teams are part-time but operators and TEMS providers may be on duty in their primary role.

The national average response time for a SWAT team is one hour.

Active assailants are often a “patrol problem” but members of SWAT may be readily available.

Consequently, agencies should consider including “blended” and “tiered” response within their training and exercises.

TEMS providers might be better utilized detached from their SWAT team.

168

Get the Tactical Bomb Technicians Rolling!



169

Mitigating Fire within the Tactical Environment



170

Tactical Alarm

- Special Weapons and Tactics
- Hazardous Devices
- Air Support
- Communications Support Team
- Incident Management Team
- Federal Law Enforcement
- Tactical Dispatchers

171

Consolidated Regional Staging




172

Hospital Task Forces




173

Oakland County Divisional Command



174



175

Interior Communication

- Always the Number One Issue in the After-Action Report
- Face to Face and Cellular are the Most Reliable.
- One Interior Law Enforcement Channel
- Conditions, Actions, Needs (CAN) and Personnel Accountability Reports (PAR)
- No Good News Reporting!
- Limit Casualty Information to Triage Color, Location, and Extraction Needs

176

Communication with the Outside

- Utilize the Community's Social Media Early
- Utilize Emergency Notification Systems Such as Nixle
- Appoint a Hasty Public Information Officer
- Use the Media to our Advantage
- Feed the Beast Every 30 - 45 Minutes
- Have the Federal Bureau of Investigation Set Up a 24 Hour Hotline for Tips and Inquiries

177

The Beast



178

Reunification



179



“I don’t know what to do with my hands.”

**Actor Will Ferrell
Ricky Bobby
Talladega Nights**

180

Research Question

Based on data from numerous prior active assailant incidents, should public safety agencies place more emphasis on the formation of extraction teams, continue to focus on rescue task forces, or train to utilize both assets when appropriate?

181

Incidents Studied

1. Columbine High School (1999)
2. Virginia Tech (2007)
3. Northern Illinois University (2008)
4. Safeway (2011)
5. Sandy Hook Elementary School (2012)
6. Century 16 Theatre (2012)
7. Los Angeles International Airport (2013)
8. Inland Regional Center (2015)
9. Pulse Nightclub (2016)

182

Analysis and Conclusion

- 117 non-ambulatory casualties
- 86 were extracted by law enforcement officers (73.5%).
- 31 were extracted by fire department or ambulance service providers (26.5%).

183

Analysis and Conclusion

- In four of the nine incidents, all non-ambulatory casualties were removed by law enforcement (45.29%).
- If not for one casualty at Virginia Tech, those numbers would have changed to five and 66.6%.
- On two incidents, all casualties were extracted by fire department providers (15.38%).

184

Unified Command begins with the first arriving law enforcement and fire department supervisors forming a hasty co-located command post!

185

Who generally determines the initial Casualty Collection Points?

Casualties and Bystanders!

186



**Rescue Task Forces are show horses and
Extraction Teams are workhorses during
an active violence incident!**

187

Unconventional Transportation



188



“Mongo only pawn ... in game of life.”

**Actor Alex Karras
Mongo
Blazing Saddles**


189



190



191



192

Contemporary Fire and EMS Tactics

- Dispatch center communicates potential threat
- The initial arriving engine or truck company officer moves to the hasty command post on foot while the remaining members of the company formalize the initial casualty collection point on the primary side.
- Additional arriving engines and/or trucks are prepared to compliment the law enforcement perimeter and formalize additional casualty collection points as needed.
- The first arriving ambulances prepare to transport the first layer of critical casualties.

193

Contemporary Uniforms



194

Contemporary Equipment



195

Contemporary Extraction




196



197

Go or No Go, Where, and How Many?!



198

**Failure Drills
and
Tactical Triage**

199

What are the Nightmare Scenarios?

- Late Night or Early Morning
- Holiday Weekend
- Cold Weather
- Hazardous Material Involved
- Many Children Involved
- Multiple Locations
- Emergency Responders Targeted
- Trauma Center/s Targeted
- Burns and Smoke Inhalation

200

What we're doing in Oakland County

- Active Violence Response Training
- Active Violence Supervisor Training
- Collaborative Response Awareness
- Collaborative Response Operations
- Large Exercises in Multiple Communities
- Annual Active Violence Conferences
- Medical Equipment for Law Enforcement
- Tactical Equipment for Emergency Medical Providers
- Preparing for Fire as a Weapon

201

What we expect of the public?

- Develop an Emergency Action Plan.
- Discuss and train annually.
- Know the difference between a first aid kit and hemorrhage control kit and have both.
- Consider purchasing casualty cards and flexible litters.
- Avoid! Deny! Defend!
- If safe to move victims inside or outside, do so.
- Cowboy Up and SURVIVE 600 seconds!

202

What they (and we) should expect?

- If you think it's gunfire, trust your instincts.
- Anticipate sensory deprivation and/or overload.
- In bombings, anticipate ruptured eardrums and impaired vision.
- Anticipate Fight, Flight, Freeze, or Fawn.
- Most offenders don't like to breach fortifications.
- Most offenders aren't skilled at clearing malfunctions.

203

Stress Inoculation



204



205

Mental Health

- Employee Assistance Program
- Peer Support Program
- On Scene Support
- Critical Incident Stress Defusing and Debriefing
- Contemporary Trauma Therapy (EMDR and CRM)
- Next Generation Trauma Therapy (Psychedelics)

206



207



208

“Maverick ... you’ll get your RIO when you get to your ship ... and if you don’t ... give me a call. I’ll fly with you.”

Actor Tom Skerritt
Commander Mike “Viper” Metcalf
Top Gun

209

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If you’re on Facebook, feel free to friend me @Jim Etzin or @North American Active Assailant Conference and request to join the private “Collaborative Response to Active Violence” group

210
